Customer-owned. Content lives in your data plane (Cloudflare account or air-gapped VPC). The vendor stores only license keys, opaque instance ids, and content-free usage counts.
Pre-answered questions for your review.
Derived from the design-partner security packet. Status: v0, design-partner stage — no SOC 2 yet; architecture is built for buyer-owned audit.
Shared. Data plane: Cloudflare (your account) or your VPC. Inference: Workers AI or the model endpoint you configure. Vendor billing: LemonSqueezy (license only, content-free). The exact configured content destinations are shown by GET /egress; the vendor domain is excluded.
Shared. HTTPS on all planes. Content at rest in your Vectorize/D1 under Cloudflare platform encryption. No vendor copy to encrypt.
No. RAG at request time only. Nothing sent to a training pipeline. Stated verbatim in GET /egress note.
Verifiable. Complete allowlist at GET /egress. Default Workers AI: empty array. Custom provider: exactly your gateway/Bedrock host. securepm.dev provably absent.
Shared. Boundary A: Bearer shared secret, constant-time compare, fail-closed. /healthz reports honest auth state.
Customer-owned. Only your Jira app + your Worker. Vendor never receives issue text, embeddings, or model output.
Customer-owned D1. Nine v1 columns plus warnings_text and compliance_action. Queryable by your compliance team in your store.
Dropped with reason in warnings; never written to Jira. Error vocab: rejected: not in allowed options.
Configurable rules can require approval or block drafts. compliance_action recorded in audit row; block returns HTTP 422.
Ed25519 statement of egress allowlist at GET /attestation. Verify offline with pinned public key.
Reference Python backend runs with zero network. Offline Ed25519 license gates /draft and /ingest.
Customer-owned. You control D1/Vectorize retention and export policy.
Design-partner contact agreed at pilot start. Vendor receives no content to breach.
Not yet. Honest v0 posture. Controls are architectural (topology) plus buyer-runnable CI gates.
Buyer can run CI egress/auth gates against their deployment. Formal third-party pentest deferred.
Maps to existing Jira and identity controls. Enterprise rollout includes architecture workshop.
Optional webhook posts audit payloads to customer SIEM URL. URL validated; network errors soft-fail.
Forge/Connect are thin front-ends; content passes through Atlassian to your Worker only.
Run test drive, curl /egress, verify /attestation, read security review, follow deployment checklist.
Need the design-partner security packet?
Architecture one-pager, 20 questionnaire answers, compliance pack mapping, and buyer-runnable CI gates from docs/design-partner-kit/.